Policy Compromises: Corruption And Regulation In A Democracy
AbstractThis paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re-elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aidt, T.S., 2009.
"Corruption, Institutions and Economic Development,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0918, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Toke S. Aidt, 2009. "Corruption, institutions, and economic development," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 271-291, Summer.
- Betty Agnani & Amaia Iza, 2005.
"Growth in an oil abundant economy: The case of Venezuela,"
DEGIT Conference Papers
c010_053, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Bety Agnany & Amaia Iza, 2008. "Growth in an oil abundant economy: The case of Venezuela," ThE Papers 08/18, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Iza Padilla, María Amaya & Agnani, Betty, 2005. "Growth in an oil abundant economy: The case of Venezuela," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-15, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Toke S. Aidt, 2011. "The Causes of Corruption," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 15-19, 07.
- Campos, Nauro F & Estrin, Saul & Proto, Eugenio, 2010.
"Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and Evidence,"
IZA Discussion Papers
5243, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Campos, Nauro F & Estrin, Saul & Proto, Eugenio, 2010. "Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 8061, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Donato De Rosa & Nishaal Gooroochurn & Holger Görg, 2010.
"Corruption and Productivity Firm-level Evidence from the BEEPS Survey,"
Kiel Working Papers
1632, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- De Rosa, Donato & Gooroochurn, Nishaal & Gorg, Holger, 2010. "Corruption and productivity : firm-level evidence from the BEEPS survey," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5348, The World Bank.
- Michael Breen & Robert Gillanders, 2012.
"Corruption, institutions and regulation,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 263-285, September.
- Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J., 2008. "A Theory of the Corrupt Keynesian," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0861, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Alexeev, Michael & Song, Yunah, 2013. "Corruption and product market competition: An empirical investigation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 154-166.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.