This paper argues that some governments adopt growth-reducing policies due to the rational self-interest of the political elites. The model takes a rent-seeking government that can block innovation and incorporates it into a Schumpeterian growth model. The quality of a country's institutions is reflected in the cost of innovation blocking. An increase in the level of innovation-blocking activity will reduce the rate of innovation and therefore reduce growth. The government also faces the possibility of losing power whenever an innovation occurs. We examine the conditions under which a government will choose to block innovation and suppress growth. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)