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Private Investment and Political Institutions

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  • David Stasavage
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    Abstract

    Recent research has demonstrated a negative link between macroeconomic and political uncertainty and levels of private investment across countries. This raises the question whether certain types of government institutions might help reduce this uncertainty. North and Weingast (1989) propose that political institutions characterized by checks and balances can have beneficial effects on investment by allowing governments to credibly commit not to engage in ex post opportunism with respect to investors. In this paper I develop and test a modified version of their hypothesis, suggesting that checks and balances, on average, improve possibilities for commitment, but that they are not a necessary condition for doing so. Results of heteroskedastic regression and quantile regression estimates strongly support this proposition. Copyright 2002 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics and Politics.

    Volume (Year): 14 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 41-63

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:p:41-63

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    Cited by:
    1. Haggard, Stephan & Tiede, Lydia, 2011. "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 673-685, May.
    2. Tuomas A. Peltonen & Ricardo M. Sousa & Isabel S. Vansteenkiste, 2009. "Asset prices, Credit and Investment in Emerging Markets," NIPE Working Papers 18/2009, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    3. Dino Falaschetti, 2004. "Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Public Economics 0401009, EconWPA.
    4. Tuomas A. Peltonen & Ricardo M. Sousa & Isabel S. Vansteenkiste, 2009. "Fundamentals, Financial Factors and The Dynamics of Investment in Emerging Markets," NIPE Working Papers 19/2009, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    5. Mohammad Amin & Priya Ranjan, 2008. "When Does Legal Origin Matter?," Working Papers 080912, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    6. Philipp an de Meulen, 2011. "Labor Heterogeneity and the Risk of Expropriation in Less Developed Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0298, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Harms, Philipp & an de Meulen, Philipp, 2013. "Demographic structure and the security of property rights: The role of development and democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 73-89.
    8. repec:slu:wpaper:2012-03 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Justesen, Mogens K. & Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2007. "The constitution of economic growth: Testing the prosperity effects of a Madisonian model on a panel of countries 1980‐2000," MPRA Paper 36063, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Steve Bond & Stephen R. Bond & Adeel Malik, 2008. "Natural resources, export structure and investment," Economics Series Working Papers CSAE WPS/2008-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    11. Busse, Matthias & Hefeker, Carsten, 2007. "Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 397-415, June.
    12. Dino Falaschetti, 2004. "Can Voting Reduce Welfare? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Public Economics 0401006, EconWPA.
    13. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector," Microeconomics 0311002, EconWPA.
    14. Martínez, Juan & Santiso, Javier, 2003. "Financial Markets and Politics: The Confidence Game in Latin American Emerging Economies," MPRA Paper 12909, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Coates, Dennis & Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2010. "The political economy of investment: Sclerotic effects from interest groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 208-221, June.
    16. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.

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