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International Oligopoly and the Taxation of Commerce with Revenue-Constrained Governments

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  • ANDREAS HAUFLER
  • MICHAEL PFLÜGER

Abstract

We evaluate the incentives for strategic commodity tax-setting under destination and origin regimes when competition is imperfect and commodity taxes must be used to finance the government budget. Different cases of international duopoly are compared, where firms compete over quantities or prices and markets are segmented or integrated. In each setting the international spillovers of tax policy are isolated and evaluated at the Pareto-efficient tax rate. We find that origin-based commodity taxation leads to a downward competition of tax rates in each of the models analysed, whereas no similarly broad-based incentives for beggar-thy-neighbour policies exist under the destination principle. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2006.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 74 (2007)
Issue (Month): 295 (08)
Pages: 451-473

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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:74:y:2007:i:295:p:451-473

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Cited by:
  1. Braun, Sebastian & Spielmann, Christian, 2012. "Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay?," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 6(30), pages 1-42.
  2. BEHRENS, Kristian & HAMILTON, Jonathan H. & OTTAVIANO, Gianmarco I.P. & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Commodity tax competition and industry location under the destination and the origin principle," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2101, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2007. "Commodity Taxation and Parallel Imports," Working Papers 04-2007, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  4. Moriconi, Simone & Sato, Yasuhiro, 2009. "International commodity taxation in the presence of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 939-949, August.

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