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Extortion

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  • Konrad, Kai A
  • Skaperdas, Stergios

Abstract

Extortion of productive enterprises ('shops') by organized crime groups ('gangs') takes place in virtually all economies. The authors develop a framework to study this activity. The main harm of extortion comes from the long-run erosion and distortion of useful production, as well as from the destruction of property that they show can occur in equilibrium. Among other results, the authors also find: gangs may increase their activity in response to increased police protection; often, but not always, forward-looking gangs induce lower resource waste than myopic gangs. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 260 (November)
Pages: 461-77

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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:461-77

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Cited by:
  1. Halvor Mehlum & Kalle Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Parasites," Development and Comp Systems 0406003, EconWPA.
    • Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl O. & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Parasites," Memorandum 16/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May.
  3. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Inequality, Democracy and the Emergence of Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4187, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Predator or prey?: Parasitic enterprises in economic development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 275-294, April.

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