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Designing Monetary Policy When Unemployment Persists

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Author Info
Lockwood, Ben
Miller, Marcus
Zhang, Lei

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Abstract

This paper investigates how unemployment persistence affects the optimal delegation of monetary policy to an independent central banker (CB). Two opposing forces are shown to be at work: with more persistence, the government's incentive to stabilize the economy is greater; but (if the CB is forward-looking) its incentive to create inflation surprises is also greater. The authors show that, owing to the second effect, the government may wish not to delegate at all, unlike the case where there is no persistence. In the event that the government does delegate, the paper identifies conditions under which either effect dominates in the government's choice of conservatism of the CB. The authors compare delegation to discretion and precommitment, using a diagrammatic approach that may be of independent interest. They also present some preliminary empirical evidence on the cross-country relationship between unemployment persistence and inflation that appears consistent with the model's predictions. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 259 (August)
Pages: 327-45
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:259:p:327-45

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  1. Richard Mash, 2002. "Monetary Policy with an Endogenous Capital Stock when Inflation is Persistent," Economics Series Working Papers 108, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Mellin, Stefan, 1998. "Inflation Target Instability and Interest Rates," Research Papers in Economics 1997:4, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2009. "Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules," Working Papers 0911, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sujit Kapadia, 2005. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Hysteresis," Economics Series Working Papers 250, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rantala, Anssi, 2003. "Labour market flexibility and policy coordination in a monetary union," Research Discussion Papers 11/2003, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  6. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alessandro Missale & Elisabetta Falcetti, . "Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank," Working Papers 169, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Teruyoshi Kobayashi, 2005. "Optimal monetary policy and the role of hybrid inflation-price-level targets," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(18), pages 2119-2125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Carlo Altavilla & Matteo Ciccarelli, 2008. "Inflation models, optimal monetary policy and uncertain unemployment dynamics: Evidence from the US and the euro area," Discussion Papers 8_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 1999. "Does talk matter after all? Inflation targeting and central bank behavior," Staff Reports 88, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rantala, Anssi, 2003. "Adaptive learning and multiple equilibria in a natural rate monetary model with unemployment persistence," Research Discussion Papers 30/2003, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  12. Florin Ovidiu BILBIIE, 2001. "Inflation Contracts, Targets and Strategic Incentives for Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2001/16, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  13. Anssi Rantala, 2004. "Labour market flexibility and policy coordination in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0405001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Castrén, Olli & Takalo , Tuomas & Wood , Geoffrey, 2004. "Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs," Research Discussion Papers 22/2004, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Jon Faust & Dale W. Henderson, 2004. "Is inflation targeting best-practice monetary policy?," International Finance Discussion Papers 807, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  17. Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 015, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. V A Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli, 1995. "Institutional Change, Inflation Targets and the Stability of Interest Rate Reaction Functions in OECD Economies"," Working Papers 9606, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Apr 1996. [Downloadable!]
  20. Anssi Rantala, 2004. "Adaptive learning and multiple equilibria in a natural rate monetary model with unemployment persistence," GE, Growth, Math methods 0404005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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