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Risk and Revelation: Changing the Value of Information

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Creane, Anthony

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Abstract

A different approach is introduced to determine the value of an information-sharing agreement: the measure of risk aversion/loving. This approach reveals the relationship between information-sharing models and the risk literature. It also allows uncertainty regarding the slope of a firm's own demand function to be examined, which previous work eschews. The results suggest that the incentive to reveal information is more prevalent than previously thought: firms prefer to commit to reveal private valued information in both quantity and price competition. This differs from previous work where the incentive to commit depended on the type of competition. Copyright 1998 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 258 (May)
Pages: 247-61
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:258:p:247-61

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  1. Young-Ro Yoon, 2008. "Strategic Disclosure of Valuable Information within Competitive Environments," Caepr Working Papers 2008-022, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
  2. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 1997. "The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange," NBER Working Papers 5981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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