Hostile versus Friendly Takeovers
AbstractThis paper analyzes the choice of a raider between a hostile and a friendly takeover. If the target company's manager has private information about the scope for efficiency gains, it is shown that the raider may prefer a hostile acquisition even if transaction costs for a friendly takeover are much smaller. The raider actually chooses between a (hostile) tender offer to uninformed shareholders and (friendly) merger negotiations with the informed manager. The author shows how the uncertainty about potential efficiency gains, the manager's preference for control, the number of shares held by the manager, and transaction costs affect the raider's choice. Copyright 1996 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 63 (1996)
Issue (Month): 249 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Schnitzer,Monika, 1991. "Hostile versus friendly takeovers," Discussion Paper Serie A 339, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Monika Schnitzer, . "Hostile Versus Friendly Takeovers," Discussion Paper Serie A 297, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Schnitzer,Monika, 1990. "Hostile versus friendly takeovers," Discussion Paper Serie A 299, University of Bonn, Germany.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andrew P. Dickerson & Heather D. Gibson & Euclid Tsakalotos, 1998.
"Takeover Risk and the Market for Corporate Control: The Experience of British Firms in the 1970s and 1980s,"
Studies in Economics
9803, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- Dickerson, Andrew P. & Gibson, Heather D. & Tsakalotos, Euclid, 2002. "Takeover risk and the market for corporate control: the experience of British firms in the 1970s and 1980s," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1167-1195, October.
- Mohd Irfan, 2011. "The role of executives in hostile takeover attempts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 29-40, May.
- Ralph P. Heinrich, 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance. A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Papers 947, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Mohd, Irfan, 2010. "The Role of Executives in Hostile Takeover Attempts," MPRA Paper 22123, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Apr 2010.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.