Dynamic Deterrence Theory
AbstractEconomic theories of deterrence have primarily been built on static models. A common and serious shortcoming of the existing dynamic deterrence models is the assumption of a two-period structure that ignores recidivism. The aims of this paper are to formulate and solve a general dynamic deterrence model that incorporates recidivistic behavior, to explore its implications, and to derive some testable predictions. The analysis shows how the value and the intensity, engaging in illegal activity change over time, highlights the weaknesses of two-period deterrence models and compares the deterrent effectiveness of increasing the likelihood of punishment versus the severity of punishment. Finally, the recidivistic model provides a structural foundation for the widely used stochastic-process models of crime in operations research and criminology. Copyright 1995 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 62 (1995)
Issue (Month): 245 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006.
"Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 214-229, February.
- Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2001. "Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime," Seminar Papers 696, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2001. "Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime," Research Papers in Economics 2001:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
- Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
- Alexandre Carvalho & Daniel Cerqueira & Waldir Lobão, 2005. "Socioeconomic Structure, Self-Fuifilment, Homicides and Spatial Dependence in Brazil," Discussion Papers 1105, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
- Mohamed Jellal & Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning," Economics Working Papers 402, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Volker Meier, 2001. "On Prison and Therapy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July.
- Wang, Shoou-Jiun & Batta, Rajan & Rump, Christopher M., 2005. "Stability of a crime level equilibrium," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 229-244, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.