The authors consider a price-taking equilibrium in the spatial setting. A (unique) pricing equilibrium is shown to exist for any set of firm locations. This equilibrium is then used to examine locational incentives in the two-stage process in which firms first choose locations anticipating the subsequent price-taking outcome. The result is spatial agglomeration if demand is inelastic and there are only two firms. Agglomeration does not occur if demand is too elastic or if there are more than two firms. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 61 (1994) Issue (Month): 242 (May) Pages: 125-36 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)