Commitment, Efficiency and Footloose Firms
Abstract
The authors consider dynamic competition between a small number of local governments to attract a single large plant. The surplus available in each location is unknown when the initial location decision is made. Two cases are considered: if all agents can commit to second period actions and if they cannot. Without commitment, initially the firm will discriminate against the region with the lower set-up costs. If first-period productivity is low, the firm may relocate and receive an ex post subsidy from a second region. Commitment decreases the expected total surplus and, if fixed costs are small, favors the firm. Copyright 1992 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 233 (February)
Pages: 63-73
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- King, I. & Welling, L., 1990. "Commitment, Efficiency and Footloose Firms," Papers 126, Calgary - Department of Economics.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Devereux, Michael P. & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2008.
"Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1210-1235, June.
- Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 642, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Devereux, Michael P & Lockwood, Ben & Redoano, Michela, 2002. "Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ronald B. Davies & Christopher J. Ellis, 2001.
"Competition in Taxes and Performance Requirements for Foreign Direct Investment,"
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers
2001-4, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jun 2001.
- Davies, Ronald B. & Ellis, Christopher J., 2007. "Competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 1423-1442, August.
- Fumagalli, Chiara, 2003. "On the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 963-983, December.
- Doyle, Christopher & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1984.
"Taxation of Foreign Multinationals: A Sequential Bargaining Approach to Tax Holidays,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
25, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October.
- Osiris J.Parcero, 2006.
"Inter-jurisdiction Subsidy Competition for a New Production Plant: What is the Central Government Optimal Policy?,"
CRIEFF Discussion Papers
0601, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- Parcero, O.J., 2007. "Inter-jurisdiction subsidy competition for a new production plant: What is the central government optimal policy?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 688-702, November.
- Ronald B. Davies, 2000.
"State Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Winnable War?,"
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers
2000-4, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jul 2002.
- Davies, Ronald B., 2005. "State tax competition for foreign direct investment: a winnable war?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 498-512, December.
- Kiymaz, Koray & Taylor, Leon, 2000.
"Competition for foreign direct investment when countries are not sure of site values,"
International Review of Economics & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 53-68, February.
- Koray Kiymaz & Leon Taylor, 1998. "Competition for foreign direct investment when countries are not sure of site values," International Trade 9812001, EconWPA, revised 23 Dec 1998.
- Osiris Parcero, 2004. "Inter-region Competition for FDI," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/100, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Jean-François Wen, 1997. "Tax Holidays and the International Capital Market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 129-148, May.
- Ying, Qianwei & Yang, Quanfa, 2007. "The role of information in the competition for FDI under uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 62-70, June.
- Bruno Jullien & Frederic Rychen & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Local Public Investment and Competition for a Firm," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1400, Econometric Society.
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