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Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory

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Author Info
Seidmann, Daniel J
Abstract

Tying-good monopolists that extract full consumer surplus from independent sales of their tying good may, nevertheless, choose to bundle in order to induce a favorable response by their tied-market rivals. In particular, bundling may facilitate supracompetitive prices for the tied good. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 232 (November)
Pages: 491-99
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:58:y:1991:i:232:p:491-99

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  1. David Spector, 2006. "Tying, bundling and collusion," PSE Working Papers 2006-02, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  2. Oilver Budzinski & Katharina Wacker, 2007. "The Prohibition of the Proposed Springer-ProSiebenSat.1-Merger: How much Economics in German Merger Control?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200704, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  3. Sue Mialon, 2009. "Exclusionary Bundling: The Motive for Mergers," Emory Economics 0907, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
  4. Edmond Baranes, 2006. "Bundling and Collusion on Communications Markets," Working Papers 06-17, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  5. Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "The Effects of Product Bundling in Duopoly," Discussion Papers in Economics 477, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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