Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Determinants of Wage Pressure: Some Implications of a Dynamic Model

Contents:

Author Info

  • Manning, Alan

Abstract

Most models of wage determination are static. This paper analyzes a simple dynamic model of collective bargaining and argues that this provides insights into the determinants of wage pressure that a static model cannot provide. In particular, it is shown how the length of labor contracts and the dynamics of the labor market affect the level of aggregate wage pressure. The policy implications of the model are very different from those traditionally put forward to moderate wage pressure. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28199108%292%3A58%3A231%3C325%3ATDOWPS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V&origin=repec
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 231 (August)
Pages: 325-39

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:58:y:1991:i:231:p:325-39

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Knabe, Andreas, 2009. "Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 161-176, March.
  2. Cahuc, P. & Granier, P., 1992. "Reduction de la duree du travail, chomage et croissance," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 92.61, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  3. Beissinger, Thomas & Buesse, Oliver, 2001. "Bismarck versus Beveridge: Which Unemployment Compensation System is More Prone to Labor Market Shocks?," IZA Discussion Papers 358, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Massimiliano Castellani & Luca Fanelli & Marco Savioli, 2013. "Government Fiscal Efforts vs. Labour Union Strikes: It Takes Two to Tango," Working Paper Series 33_13, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Jan 2014.
  5. Beissinger, Thomas & Buesse, Oliver, 2002. "The Impact of the Unemployment Benefit System on International Spillover Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 656, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Olivier Bontout & Sébastien Jean, 1998. "Wages and Unemployment: Trade-off Under Different Labour Market Paradigms," Working Papers 1998-13, CEPII research center.
  7. J. Richardson, 1997. "Can active labour market policy work? Some theoretical considerations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Van der Linden, Bruno, 1997. "Basic income and unemployment in a unionized economy," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 10 Jul 1997.
  9. Beissinger, Thomas & Egger, Hartmut, 2001. "Dynamic Wage Bargaining if Benefits are Tied to Individual Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 389, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Jennifer C. Smith, 1996. "Effet du pouvoir de négociation et du marché local du travail sur la détermination des salaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 126(5), pages 1-17.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:58:y:1991:i:231:p:325-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.