The Determinants of Wage Pressure: Some Implications of a Dynamic Model
AbstractMost models of wage determination are static. This paper analyzes a simple dynamic model of collective bargaining and argues that this provides insights into the determinants of wage pressure that a static model cannot provide. In particular, it is shown how the length of labor contracts and the dynamics of the labor market affect the level of aggregate wage pressure. The policy implications of the model are very different from those traditionally put forward to moderate wage pressure. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 231 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cahuc, P. & Granier, P., 1992.
"Reduction de la duree du travail, chomage et croissance,"
Papiers d'Economie MathÃÂ©matique et Applications
92.61, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Cahuc, Pierre & Granier, Pierre, 1994. "Réduction de la durée du travail, chômage et croissance," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(4), pages 453-476, dÃ©cembre.
- Olivier Bontout & Sébastien Jean, 1998. "Wages and Unemployment: Trade-off Under Different Labour Market Paradigms," Working Papers 1998-13, CEPII research center.
- Beissinger, Thomas & Büsse, Oliver, 2002.
"The Impact of the Unemployment Benefit System on International Spillover Effects,"
University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems
376, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
- Beissinger, Thomas & Buesse, Oliver, 2002. "The Impact of the Unemployment Benefit System on International Spillover Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 656, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Beissinger, Thomas & Egger, Hartmut, 2001.
"Dynamic Wage Bargaining if Benefits are Tied to Individual Wages,"
IZA Discussion Papers
389, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Thomas Beissinger & Hartmut Egger, 2004. "Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 437-460, July.
- Beissinger, Thomas & Buesse, Oliver, 2001.
"Bismarck versus Beveridge: Which Unemployment Compensation System is More Prone to Labor Market Shocks?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
358, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Thomas Beissinger & Oliver Büsse, 2001. "Bismarck versus Beveridge: Which Unemployment Compensation System is more Prone to Labor Market Shocks?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(1), pages 78-, December.
- Jennifer C. Smith, 1996. "Effet du pouvoir de négociation et du marché local du travail sur la détermination des salaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 126(5), pages 1-17.
- Knabe, Andreas, 2009. "Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 161-176, March.
- Van der Linden, Bruno, 1997. "Basic income and unemployment in a unionized economy," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 10 Jul 1997.
- Massimiliano Castellani & Luca Fanelli & Marco Savioli, 2013. "Government Fiscal Efforts vs. Labour Union Strikes: An Estimated Cournot-Nash Policy Game," Working Paper Series 33_13, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Aug 2013.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.