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Firm-Specific Training and Contract Length

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Author Info
Cantor, Richard

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Abstract

Wages subject to continuous renegotiations provide inefficient incentives for the creation of firm-specific human capital if training requires both firm investment and worker effort. Noncontingent career-long, fixed-wage contracts do not induce efficient levels of training because they award all the quasi-rents from training to the firm, leaving no incentive for trainee effort. Intermediate-length, fixed-wage contracts with known expiration dates can improve training incentives. During the life of the contract, all the quasi-rents accrue to the firm, but the trainee puts forth effort because he can appropriate future rents after the contract expires. Copyright 1990 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 225 (February)
Pages: 1-14
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:57:y:1990:i:225:p:1-14

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  1. Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2002. "Adverse Selection, Short-Term Contracting, and the Underprovision of On-the-Job Training," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  2. Mohamed Ben Halima & Bassem Ben Halima, 2008. "Determinants for Labour Contract Length: A French Microeconometric Study," Post-Print halshs-00365976_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Mohamed Ali Ben Halima, 2005. "The determinants for labour contract length A French micro-econometric study," Working Papers 0503, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
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