Ross Starr (1973) demonstrates that a competitive equilibrium, while ex ante Pareto efficient, may not be ex post efficient. The authors contend that an implicit second-best issue requires that this assertion be substantively qualified. Specifically, the ex ante efficiency concept is second best, while its ex post counterpart is first best. They est ablish the equivalency of first-best ex post and ex ante concepts whe never the second-best ex ante efficiency conditions hold. The second best elements derive from the timing of information flows. Starr's theorem is shown to concern the social gains from improved information. Additional results deal with varying concepts of ex post welfare. Copyright 1988 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 55 (1988) Issue (Month): 217 (February) Pages: 63-79 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)