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The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability

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Author Info
Aivazian, Varouj A
Callen, Jeffrey L
Lipnowski, Irwin
Abstract

It is the contention of this paper that the Coase theorem has yet to be formulated and proved in a rigorou s manner. The paper addresses the problem of strategic coalitional be havior when more than two agents are involved in the externality. It is shown that there are examples for which nonefficient allocations a re stable in the sense of Aumann-Maschler bargaining sets, thereby vi tiating the Coase theorem. Hence a proper formulation of the Coase th eorem must exclude bargaining-set stability. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 54 (1987)
Issue (Month): 216 (November)
Pages: 517-20
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:216:p:517-20

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  1. Luis Sanchez-Mier, . "A Theory of Political Influence and Economic Organization," School of Economics Working Papers EC200504, Universidad de Guanajuato. [Downloadable!]
  2. Benoit, J.P. & Kornhauser, L.A., 1996. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions," Working Papers 96-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  3. John P. Conley & Stefani C. Smith, 2004. "Existence and Efficiency of a Price-Taking Equilibrium in an Economy with Public Goods, Externalities and Property Rights: A Coasian Approach," Working Papers 0403, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
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