Wages Policy and Unemployment in Australia
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 53 (1986)
Issue (Month): 210(S) (Supplement)
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- Jeff Borland & Ian McDonald, 2000. "Labour Market Models of Unemployment in Australia," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2000n15, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
- Willem H. Buiter, 1987. "The Right Combination of Demand and Supply Policies: The Case for a Two-Handed Approach," NBER Working Papers 2333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Buiter, Willem H & Grafe, Clemens, 2001. "No Pain, No Gain? The Simple Analytics of Efficient Disinflation in Open Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3038, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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