The Behavior Of Inexperienced Bidders In Internet Auctions
Abstract
"In Internet auctions, bidders alter their strategies as they gain market experience. While inexperienced bidders bid the same high amounts regardless of the seller's reputation, experienced bidders bid substantially less if the seller has yet to establish a reputation and raise their bids as reports are filed that the seller has treated bidders well in the past. Experienced bidders also wait until much closer to the end of the auction to place their bids, although it takes very little experience to learn that waiting to submit one's bid is a superior strategy." ("JEL" L14, L15, D83, D12) Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 48 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 237-253
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Related research
Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "Learning to bid, but not to quit – Experience and Internet auctions," MPRA Paper 14815, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Genti Kostandini & Elton Mykerezi & Eftila Tanellari & Nour Dib, 2011. "Does Buyer Experience Pay Off? Evidence from eBay," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 253-265, November.
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