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How Does Health Insurance Affect Workers’ Compensation Filing?

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  • DARIUS N LAKDAWALLA
  • ROBERT T REVILLE
  • SETH A SEABURY

Abstract

About half of injured workers choose not to file workers’ compensation claims. This is thought to result from their use of health insurance instead of workers’ compensation. However, the data suggest that insured workers are actually less likely to file than their more vulnerable uninsured counterparts. We found that this relationship emerges as the result of employer characteristics and, in particular, that employers who offer health insurance to employees are more likely to have workers who file claims; this is much more important than the insurance status of workers themselves or fixed worker characteristics. (JEL I1, J3)

Suggested Citation

  • Darius N Lakdawalla & Robert T Reville & Seth A Seabury, 2007. "How Does Health Insurance Affect Workers’ Compensation Filing?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 286-303, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:45:y:2007:i:2:p:286-303
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00011.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Erin Todd Bronchetti & Melissa McInerney, 2012. "Revisiting Incentive Effects in Workers' Compensation: Do Higher Benefits Really Induce More Claims?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(2), pages 286-315, April.
    2. Woock, Christopher, 2009. "Unions and the decision to apply for and the receipt of workers' compensation benefits," MPRA Paper 14689, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Woock, Christopher, 2009. "Do unions protect injured workers from earnings losses?," MPRA Paper 16856, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Woock, Christopher, 2007. "The earnings losses of injured men: Accounting for injuries outside the Workers' Compensation system," MPRA Paper 14688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Olesya Fomenko & Jonathan Gruber, 2019. "Reclassification to Avoid Consumer Cost-Sharing in Group Health Plans," NBER Working Papers 25870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Alison Morantz, 2010. "Opting Out of Workers' Compensation in Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers," NBER Chapters, in: Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, pages 197-238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dillender, Marcus, 2015. "The effect of health insurance on workers’ compensation filing: Evidence from the affordable care act's age-based threshold for dependent coverage," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 204-228.
    8. Guardado, José R. & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2013. "A Model of Worker Investment in Safety and Its Effects on Accidents and Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 7428, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Courtney B. Baggett & Cassandra R. Cole & George Crowley & E. Tice Sirmans, 2020. "Spillover effects of increased health insurance enrollment on workers’ compensation insurance," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 23(1), pages 53-74, March.
    10. repec:mrr:papers:wp341 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Dillender, Marcus, 2018. "What happens when the insurer can say no? Assessing prior authorization as a tool to prevent high-risk prescriptions and to lower costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 170-200.
    12. Rahi Abouk & Keshar M. Ghimire & Johanna Catherine Maclean & David Powell, 2023. "Pain Management and Work Capacity: Evidence From Workers’ Compensation and Marijuana Legalization," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 737-770, June.
    13. Paul Heaton & Caleb Flint, 2021. "Medicaid coverage expansions and liability insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(1), pages 29-51, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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