Sharecropping between poor landlords and rich tenants has hitherto been the subject of very little academic scrutiny. Given that such 'reverse share tenancy' contracts are mostly at odds with the canonical risk-sharing explanation for sharecropping, this article discusses a rationale for them that relies on weak property rights as well as the legal doctrine of adverse possession, and tests it using data from Lac Alaotra, Madagascar, where this type of tenancy accounts for one-third of land rentals. The empirical findings are discussed in relation to recent land-reform policies by the Government of Madagascar, the World Bank, IFAD, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Copyright (c) The Author 2009. Journal compilation (c) 2009 Overseas Development Institute..
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