Private Provision of Infrastructure in Emerging Markets: Do Institutions Matter?
AbstractGovernments in developing countries have encouraged private sector investment to meet the growing demand for infrastructure. According to institutional theory, the role of institutions is paramount in private sector development. A longitudinal dataset of 40 developing economies between 1990 and 2000 is used to test empirically how different institutional structures affect private investment in infrastructure, in particular its volume and frequency. The results indicate that property rights and bureaucratic quality play a significant role in promoting private infrastructure investment. Interestingly, they also suggest that countries with higher levels of corruption attract greater private participation in infrastructure. Copyright 2006 Overseas Development Institute.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Overseas Development Institute in its journal Development Policy Review.
Volume (Year): 24 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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