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Corporate Governance in Germany: the move to shareholder value

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  • Florian Schilling

Abstract

The paper offers an inside view of the German corporate governance model, based on interviews with over 100 members of supervisory‐ (Aufsichtsrat) and executive‐boards (Vorstand) of major German corporations. The traditional supervisory board with its large size of 20 members, one half elected by the employees, reflects the strong consensus orientation of the German corporate world. This system worked well in times of long innovation cycles and largely separate, national capital markets. It is coming under increasing pressure to adapt to the demands of a fast changing globalised capital market.Keywords: Corporate governance in Germany, supervisory board, codetermination, board composition, professionalisation of boards

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Schilling, 2001. "Corporate Governance in Germany: the move to shareholder value," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 148-151, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:9:y:2001:i:3:p:148-151
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00242
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    Cited by:

    1. Ebert, Michael & Zein, Nicole, 2007. "Wertorientierte Vergütung des Aufsichtsrats - Auswirkungen auf den Unternehmswert," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-39, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    2. Joni, Joni & Ahmed, Kamran & Hamilton, Jane, 2020. "Politically connected boards, family and business group affiliations, and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3).
    3. Ebert, Michael & Zein, Nicole, 2007. "Wertorientierte Vergütung des Aufsichtsrats : Auswirkungen auf den Unternehmenswert," Papers 07-39, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    4. Ding, Yuan & Richard, Jacques & Stolowy, Hervé, 2008. "Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 718-755.
    5. Ernstberger, Jürgen & Vogler, Oliver, 2008. "Analyzing the German accounting triad -- "Accounting Premium" for IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP vis-à-vis German GAAP?," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 339-386, December.
    6. Yeh, Chien Mu & Taylor, Tracy & Hoye, Russell, 2009. "Board roles in organisations with a dual board system: Empirical evidence from Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 91-100, May.
    7. Pieter-Jan Bezemer & Stefan Peij & Gregory Maassen & Han Halder, 2012. "The changing role of the supervisory board chairman: the case of the Netherlands (1997–2007)," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(1), pages 37-55, February.
    8. Thomas Gstraunthaler & János Lukács & Marcel Steller, 2008. "The Board of Directors and its Role in the Corporate Governance System - Considerations about the Control Model - A Research Note," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), International Hellenic University (IHU), Kavala Campus, Greece (formerly Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology - EMaTTech), vol. 1(1), pages 37-54, April.

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