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Beyond the Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: towards a plurality of corporate governance logics

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  • Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens
  • J. A. (Jordan) Otten

Abstract

The dichotomous worlds hypothesis holds that corporate governance systems worldwide are either based on the Anglo‐American shareholder model or the Eurasian stakeholder model. We suggest a more fine‐grained classification, based on five corporate governance logics – socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which all parties involved in economic productive activities structure their material interdependencies and provide meaning to the social reality of corporate life. These logics are discovered through a content analysis of the corporate governance reform codes of 38 countries.

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  • Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens & J. A. (Jordan) Otten, 2007. "Beyond the Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: towards a plurality of corporate governance logics," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1288-1300, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:15:y:2007:i:6:p:1288-1300
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00647.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2009. "Hierarchy of governance institutions and the pecking order of privatisation: Central-Eastern Europe and Central Asia reconsidered," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 399-423.
    2. Themistokles Lazarides & Evaggelos Drimpetas, 2016. "Defining the factors of Fitch rankings in the European banking sector," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 6(2), pages 315-339, August.
    3. Hearn, Bruce, 2013. "The impact of board governance on director compensation in West African IPO firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 82-104.
    4. Ilya Okhmatovskiy, 2017. "Self-regulation of corporate governance in Russian firms: translating the national standard into internal policies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(2), pages 499-532, June.
    5. Pursey Heugens & Marc Essen & J. Oosterhout, 2009. "Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 481-512, September.
    6. Ferreira, Luciana C. de Mesquita & Heugens, Pursey M. A. R. & Oosterhout, Hans van, 2010. "When a Thousand Words are (Not) Enough: An Empirical Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and Attention to Shareholders," Insper Working Papers wpe_223, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    7. Otten, J.A., 2008. "Theories on executive pay. A literature overview and critical assessment," MPRA Paper 6969, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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