Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: an overview of the application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004
AbstractThis article examines the overall acceptance of the best practice provisions contained in the Dutch corporate governance code and identifies those that receive comparably less agreement among 150 Dutch listed companies in 2004. The findings indicate a high level of compliance with the Code. Moreover, the extent of compliance is positively associated with company size. Provisions related to the remuneration of board members, independence of supervisory board members, and requirements with respect to internal control systems stand out when it comes to non-compliance. In addition, the nature and content of the explanations provided for non-compliance are remarkably similar across companies, which may indicate symbolic compliance with the Code's best practice provisions. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Corporate Governance: An International Review.
Volume (Year): 15 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1
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- Stefan Arping & Zacharias Sautner, 2010.
"Corporate Governance and Leverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
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- Tariq, Yasir Bin & Abbas, Zaheer, 2013. "Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 565-575.
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