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Ownership, Corporate Governance and Top Management Pay in Hong Kong

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  • Suwina Cheng
  • Michael Firth

Abstract

Top management pay has been the focus of intense scrutiny and debate in many countries. Important issues include how compensation is decided and whether it is a function of performance. The purpose of this study is to examine top management pay in Hong Kong and to investigate how it is affected by firms’ ownership and governance characteristics. A distinguishing characteristic of many listed firms in Hong Kong is the large proportion of share capital owned by the directors, and we argue that this moderates top management pay. We also investigate the role of institutional ownership and board composition in the determination of pay. We find that director and institutional ownership moderate compensation but that there is little evidence that they encourage pay‐for‐performance reward schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Suwina Cheng & Michael Firth, 2005. "Ownership, Corporate Governance and Top Management Pay in Hong Kong," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 291-302, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:13:y:2005:i:2:p:291-302
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00423.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu Ping & Hosain Md Sajjad & Li Liyan, 2019. "Does the compensation gap between executives and staffs influence future firm performance? The moderating roles of managerial power and overconfidence," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 55(4), pages 287-318, December.
    2. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi, 2011. "Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, February.
    3. Kweh, Qian Long & Tebourbi, Imen & Lo, Huai-Chun & Huang, Cheng-Tsu, 2022. "CEO compensation and firm performance: Evidence from financially constrained firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    4. Jesper Banghøj & Gorm Gabrielsen & Christian Petersen & Thomas Plenborg, 2010. "Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 50(3), pages 481-510, September.
    5. Elena Merino & Montserrat Manzaneque-Lizano & Jesus Sanchez-Araque, 2019. "Sustainability and Corporate Governance: Transparency and Excessive Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies during the Global Financial Crisis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-19, December.
    6. Hideaki Sakawa & Naoki Watanabel, 2008. "Relationship between Managerial Compensation and Business Performance in Japan: New Evidence Using Micro Data," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 431-455, December.
    7. Gregorio Sánchez‐Marín & María Encarnación Lucas‐Pérez & Samuel Baixauli‐Soler & Brian G.M. Main & Antonio Mínguez‐Vera, 2022. "Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2817-2837, October.
    8. Paul B. McGuinness, 2018. "IPO Firm Performance and Its Link with Board Officer Gender, Family-Ties and Other Demographics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 152(2), pages 499-521, October.
    9. Manzaneque, Montserrat & Merino, Elena & Priego, Alba María, 2016. "The role of institutional shareholders as owners and directors and the financial distress likelihood. Evidence from a concentrated ownership context," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 439-451.
    10. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
    11. Jaiswall, Sudhir Shiv Kumar & Bhattacharyya, Asish Kumar, 2016. "Corporate governance and CEO compensation in Indian firms," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 159-175.
    12. Sunny Sun & Xia Zhao & Haibin Yang, 2010. "Executive compensation in Asia: A critical review and outlook," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 775-802, December.
    13. Ho, Joanna & Huang, Cheng Jen & Karuna, Christo, 2020. "Large shareholder ownership types and board governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    14. Elena Merino & Montserrat Manzaneque & Alba Maria Priego, 2013. "“Board independence” and compensation structure of directors," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 2(2), pages 125-152.

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