IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v5y1987i1p77-83.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

DANGERS OF CAPITAL FORBEARANCE: THE CASE OF THE FSLIC AND “ZOMBIE” S&Ls

Author

Listed:
  • EDWARD J. KANE

Abstract

This paper portrays Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) forbearance and congressional unwillingness to increase the FSLIC's human or capital resources to the size necessary to handle developing economic insolvencies as a joint policy crime that has served to bifurcate the savings and loan industry into the living and the living dead. As agents for the taxpayer, Congress and the FSLIC have assumed too much discretion and have chosen to exercise that discretion myopically. An agent has a duty to represent its principal's economic interests more effectively than this. The FSLIC's policy touchstone should be to negotiate and enforce the same kind of covenant provisions that a prudent private guarantor would require.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Kane, 1987. "DANGERS OF CAPITAL FORBEARANCE: THE CASE OF THE FSLIC AND “ZOMBIE” S&Ls," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 5(1), pages 77-83, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:5:y:1987:i:1:p:77-83
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1987.tb00247.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1987.tb00247.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1987.tb00247.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:fip:a00001:94154 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Yu, Miao & Guo, Yue Mei & Wang, Di & Gao, Xiaohan, 2021. "How do zombie firms affect debt financing costs of others: From spillover effects views," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    3. Edward J. Kane, 1989. "How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit-Insurance Funds Fail," NBER Working Papers 2836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Larry D. Wall, 2021. "So Far, So Good: Government Insurance of Financial Sector Tail Risk," Policy Hub, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 2021(13), November.
    5. Liu, Guangqiang & Zhang, Xiaojie & Zhang, Wanting & Wang, Di, 2019. "The impact of government subsidies on the capacity utilization of zombie firms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 51-64.
    6. Amir Amel-Zadeh & Geoff Meeks, 2013. "Bank Failure, Mark-to-market and the Financial Crisis," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 49(3), pages 308-339, September.
    7. Juncheng Li & Jun Hu & Lu Yang, 2021. "Can Trade Facilitation Prevent the Formation of Zombie Firms? Evidence from the China Railway Express," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 29(1), pages 130-151, January.
    8. Edward J. Kane & Min-Teh Yu, 1994. "How Much Did Capital Forbearance Add to the Cost of the S&L Insurance Mess," NBER Working Papers 4701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2004. "Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 455-483, June.
    10. Chaowei Wang & Vo Phuong Mai Le & Kent Matthews & Peng Zhou, 2021. "Shadow banking activity and entrusted loans in a DSGE model of China," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(5), pages 445-469, September.
    11. Korte, Josef, 2013. "Catharsis - The Real Effects of Bank Insolvency and Resolution," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79938, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Shen, Guangjun & Chen, Binkai, 2017. "Zombie firms and over-capacity in Chinese manufacturing," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 327-342.
    13. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 311-325.
    14. Chenyan Zhang & Yongqiao Chen & Huiyu Zhou, 2020. "Zombie Firms and Soft Budget Constraints in the Chinese Stock Market," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 51-77, March.
    15. Sean Hundtofte, 2017. "Does going easy on distressed banks help the macroeconomy?," Staff Reports 823, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    16. Ren, Meixu & Zhao, Jinxuan & Zhao, Jingmei, 2023. "Why is it difficult for Chinese companies to operate across regions in China?—Evidence from zombie companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    17. Yu, Yongze & Li, Ke & Duan, Shenglan & Song, Chenchen, 2023. "Economic growth and environmental pollution in China: New evidence from government work reports," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    18. Dai, Xiaoyong & Qiao, Xiaole & Song, Lin, 2019. "Zombie firms in China's coal mining sector: Identification, transition determinants and policy implications," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 664-673.
    19. Marinč, Matej & Rant, Vasja, 2014. "A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 134-150.
    20. Chuang‐Chang Chang & San‐Lin Chung & Ruey‐Jenn Ho & Yu‐Jen Hsiao, 2022. "Revisiting the valuation of deposit insurance," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 77-103, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elijah Brewer III & Thomas H. Mondschean & Philip Strahan, 1996. "The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-15, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Honohan, Patrick*Vittas, Dimitri, 1996. "Bank regulation and the network paradigm : policy implications for developing and transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1631, The World Bank.
    3. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18973 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Gropp, Reint E. & Köhler, Matthias, 2010. "Bank owners or bank managers: who is keen on risk? Evidence from the financial crisis," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-013, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Jan Bartholdy & Glenn Boyle & Roger Stover, 2004. "Deposit insurance and the stock market: evidence from Denmark," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(6), pages 567-578.
    6. Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross, 2009. "Bank governance, regulation and risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 259-275, August.
    7. Gillian Garcia & Henriëtte Prast, 2004. "Depositor and investor protection in the Netherlands: past, present and future," DNB Occasional Studies 202, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    8. John B. Shoven & Scott B. Smart & Joel Waldfogel, 1992. "Real Interest Rates and the Savings and Loan Crisis: The Moral Hazard Premium," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 155-167, Winter.
    9. Kane, Edward J & Unal, Haluk, 1990. "Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 113-136, March.
    10. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1994. "Bank Real Estate Lending and the New England Capital Crunch," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 33-58, March.
    11. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Miller, Scott A. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2011. "Charter value, Tobin's Q and bank risk during the subprime financial crisis," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 372-391, September.
    12. Hellwig Martin, 2000. "Banken zwischen Politik und Markt: Worin besteht die volkswirtschaftliche Verantwortung der Banken?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 337-356, August.
    13. Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December.
    14. Ross Levine & Norman Loayza & Thorsten Beck, 2002. "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 031-084, Central Bank of Chile.
    15. William Gissy, 2000. "Regulatory forbearance: A reconsideration," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 6(4), pages 722-729, November.
    16. Nagarajan, S. & Sealey, C. W., 1995. "Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1109-1130, September.
    17. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1993. "US Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8, pages 319-377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Martin Hellwig, 1986. "Risikoallokation in einem Marktsystem," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 231-251, September.
    19. Richard J. Cebula, 1996. "Geographic Differentials In The Rate Of Return On Savings And Loan Assets," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 41-53, Summer.
    20. Maximilian Hall, 1999. "Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan: Better Late Than Never?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 15(3), pages 211-242, May.
    21. William G. Gale, 1990. "The Hybrid Plan: A Proposal For Federal Credit Reform," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 107-121, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:5:y:1987:i:1:p:77-83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.