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Regulation And The Communications Revolution:Introduction

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  • THOMAS W. HAZLETT

Abstract

Two recent court rulings have forced both law and economics to seriously reevaluate emerging marketplaces. In Sony Corporation v. Universal Studios (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that videocassette recorders do not infringe upon the patent rights of a movie producer whose creation is viewed but not purchased (i.e., not bought from the producer or its assignee). This copyright issue has turned into a powerful political issue and a hot subject of conversation…in Hollywood as well as in Washington, D.C.

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  • Thomas W. Hazlett, 1986. "Regulation And The Communications Revolution:Introduction," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 4(2), pages 52-53, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:4:y:1986:i:2:p:52-53
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1986.tb00841.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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