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“Smart” Guns: A Technological Fix For Regulating The Secondary Market

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  • Philip J. Cook
  • James A. Leitzel

Abstract

A “personalized” or “smart” gun will not fire unless it is being used by an authorized individual. Such guns have the potential to reduce the negative externalities of gun ownership while preserving the benefits. Ongoing efforts to develop practical “smart” designs make it timely to consider regulations that would favor or mandate them in the market for new guns. The likely consequences would depend on the design details, in particular the costs of transferring the “key” to firing such guns. With an “ideal” design, transferring the key would require special equipment that could be monitored by appropriate authorities. The result would be to block thefts and other transfers of such guns in the secondary market and, in the long run, reduce access by individuals who are proscribed from possessing a gun. Personalized guns, therefore, could make existing firearms regulations more effective and reduce the social costs associated with gun misuse. Though personalized guns have advantages relative to standard guns in a wide variety of situations, some of the potential benefits of personalized guns could be captured through alternative policy measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, 2002. "“Smart” Guns: A Technological Fix For Regulating The Secondary Market," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(1), pages 38-49, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:38-49
    DOI: 10.1093/cep/20.1.38
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Interfering with Secondary Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
    2. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
    3. Wallner, Klaus, 1998. "Bundled Sales as Self-Selection Devise," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 253, Stockholm School of Economics.
    4. Mark Duggan, 2001. "More Guns, More Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1086-1114, October.
    5. Benjamin, Daniel K & Kormendi, Roger C, 1974. "The Interrelationship between Markets for New and Used Durable Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 381-401, October.
    6. Miller, H Laurence, Jr, 1974. "On Killing off the Market for Used Textbooks and the Relationship between Markets for New and Secondhand Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 612-619, May/June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig & Adam Samaha, 2010. "Gun Control after "Heller": Litigating against Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, pages 103-135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Cook, Philip J. & Ludwig, Jens, 2006. "The social costs of gun ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 379-391, January.
    3. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, 2006. "Aiming for evidence-based gun policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 691-735.

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