"Using experimental economics, this paper tests the potential impacts of modifying the centralized quota exchange system in Quebec with the intent of decreasing the quota price while minimizing negative impacts on auction effectiveness. Two separate treatments are applied to a uniform price auction similar to that employed in Quebec. The first treatment is an exclusion (5% or 15%) of the highest buyer bids and seller offers. The second is a tax (2% or 10%) on all units offered for sale that remain unsold. Various combinations of the two treatments are also tested. The results suggest that exclusion of the highest bids and offers can decrease the price of the quota and that a 15% exclusion rate is more effective than a 5% rate. The tax alone has little impact on quota price. The combination of the two treatments generates a more marked reduction in both the number of exchanges and the price of the quota than when the tax or the exclusion is applied individually. However, the combination of treatments results in a greater loss of economic efficiency. In all cases, relatively small market price reductions are realized at the expense of substantial losses in economic efficiency." Copyright (c) 2008 Canadian Agricultural Economics Society.
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