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Competitiveness And Stability Of Collusive Behavior

Author

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  • Toshihiro Matsumura
  • Noriaki Matsushima

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2012. "Competitiveness And Stability Of Collusive Behavior," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(Supplemen), pages 22-31, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:64:y:2012:i:s1:p:s22-s31
    DOI: j.1467-8586.2012.00439.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00439.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2015. "Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly: The case of relative profit maximization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 37-43.
    2. Hirose, Kosuke & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2023. "Green transformation in oligopoly markets under common ownership," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    3. Ludwig Auer & Tu Anh Pham, 2023. "Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 181-207, December.
    4. Takuya Iimura, 2020. "Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 681-697, September.
    5. Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "Non‐linear revenue evaluation," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(5), pages 487-505, November.
    6. Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2018. "Government-leading welfare-improving collusion," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 363-370.
    7. Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2020. "Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 213-224, July.
    8. Lee, Jen-Yao & Wang, Leonard F. S. & Sun, Ji, 2022. "Relative-performance delegation destabilizes upstream collusion," MPRA Paper 114939, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Oct 2022.
    9. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2017. "Competitiveness of Firm Behavior and Public Policy for New Technology Adoption in an Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 135-151, June.
    10. Hirose, Kosuke & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2022. "Common ownership and environmental Corporate Social Responsibility," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    11. Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro & Yoshida, Shohei, 2018. "Competitive pressure from neighboring markets and optimal privatization policy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-8.
    12. Toshihiro Matsumura & Makoto Okamura, 2015. "Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(2), pages 137-150, October.
    13. Xu, Lili & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2022. "Welfare-reducing price competition under relative performance delegation with convex costs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    14. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Matsushima, Noriaki & Cato, Susumu, 2013. "Competitiveness and R&D competition revisited," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 541-547.
    15. Toshihiro Matsumura & Akira Ogawa, 2014. "Corporate Social Responsibility or Payoff Asymmetry? A Study of an Endogenous Timing Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 457-473, October.
    16. Nakamura, Yasuhiko, 2014. "Biased managers as strategic commitment: The relative profit approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 230-238.
    17. Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2020. "Common Ownership among Private Firms and Privatization Policies," MPRA Paper 102152, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Liu, Yi & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2022. "Welfare effects of common ownership in an international duopoly," MPRA Paper 115177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Xingtang Wang & Jie Li, 2020. "Downstream rivals’ competition, bargaining, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 61-75, September.
    20. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2015. "Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly with Relative Profit-Maximizers," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 323-336, December.
    21. Leonard F. S. Wang & Han Wang, 2021. "Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(2), pages 127-146, October.
    22. Bin Ying & Leonard F. S. Wang & Qidi Zhang, 2023. "Upstream collusion and corporate social responsibility in downstream competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(2), pages 1020-1028, March.
    23. Ludwig von Auer & Tu Anh Pham, 2023. "Imperfect Collusion On Surveilled Markets With Free Entry," Research Papers in Economics 2023-05, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    24. Song, Ruichao & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2017. "Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 23-26.
    25. Atsuhiro Satoh & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2018. "Maximin and Minimax Strategies in Two-Players Game with Two Strategic Variables," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(01), pages 1-13, March.

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