In this paper imperfect meritocracy is defined as the appointment in the public sector of unsuitable (in the sense of merit) individuals for political reasons. After discussing the possible causes for the emergence of an imperfect meritocracy framework, the paper then sets the basis for an economic analysis of typical politicians behaviour in such a framework. After deriving the demand for political appointments, the analysis verifies the intuitive insight that the number of political appointments falls when politicians are competent. Another main result is that the more votes an appointment carries through relatives and friends, the greater the demand for political appointments. Finally, it is shown that the demand for political appointments increases when taxation and the price index increase and that it falls when income increases. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
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Volume (Year): 51 (1999) Issue (Month): 2 (April) Pages: 151-62 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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