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UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency - A Research Note

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  • Jay Fattorusso
  • Rodion Skovoroda
  • Trevor Buck
  • Alistair Bruce
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    Abstract

    High levels of executive pay in the USA and the UK have attracted journalistic and academic criticism to the effect that they constitute rent extraction by self-interested executives rather than rewards for raising shareholder returns. The focus of most criticism has been on salary, severance payments and various long-term incentives (particularly share options). However, executive bonuses have attracted little attention and have been only lightly regulated. This raises important questions. Has lighter regulation been associated with significant levels of rent extraction through bonuses, that is, a weak relation between bonus pay and shareholder returns? Have more transparent performance conditions attached to bonuses strengthened the relation, making rent extraction more difficult, or have they acted as camouflage for rent extraction, associated with higher bonus pay but lower pay-performance responsiveness? Are measures of CEO power associated with larger bonuses? This empirical note provides the first, preliminary answers to these questions. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2007.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by London School of Economics in its journal British Journal of Industrial Relations.

    Volume (Year): 45 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 3 (09)
    Pages: 518-536

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:518-536

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    Cited by:
    1. Gregory Heem, 2010. "Les critères de détermination de la part variable de la rémunération des dirigeants du CAC 40," Post-Print hal-00476935, HAL.

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