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Internal Wage Structures and Organizational Performance

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  • P. B. Beaumont
  • R. I. D. Harris

Abstract

This paper considers whether a hierarchical or compressed wage structure is positively associated with relatively high levels of organizational performance. To date, there has been little empirical research in this area (especially in the UK). Thus we present an operational measure of a compressed/hierarchical wage structure, using UK manufacturing micro–data in five industrial sectors, and examine its relationship with labour productivity. We find that the wage compression argument holds in one sector but not for the majority of sectors and that taking into account other, intra–industry characteristics, namely size and ownership differences, further weakens the relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • P. B. Beaumont & R. I. D. Harris, 2003. "Internal Wage Structures and Organizational Performance," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 41(1), pages 53-70, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:41:y:2003:i:1:p:53-70
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8543.00261
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benoît Mahy & François Rycx & Mélanie Volral, 2011. "Does Wage Dispersion Make All Firms Productive?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(4), pages 455-489, September.
    2. Christian Grund & Niels Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008. "The Dispersion of Employees' Wage Increases and Firm Performance," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(4), pages 485-501, July.
    3. Benoît Mahy & François Rycx & Mélanie Volral, 2011. "Wage Dispersion and Firm Productivity in Different Working Environments," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 460-485, September.
    4. Egon Franck & Stephan Nüesch, 2007. "Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis," Working Papers 0017, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    5. Nana Adrian & Marc Möller, 2020. "Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 315-334, April.
    6. Madhur Bhatia & Rachita Gulati, 2023. "Does ‘inter-bank’ horizontal pay disparity influence performance? Evidence from emerging economy," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 327-343, December.
    7. repec:lan:wpaper:3727 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Gian Carlo Cainarca & Francesco Delfino & Linda Ponta, 2019. "The Effect of Monetary Incentives on Individual and Organizational Performance in an Italian Public Institution," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-19, September.
    9. repec:lan:wpaper:4012 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:lan:wpaper:3621 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Anna Bykova & Dennis Coates, 2020. "Does Experience Matter? Salary Dispersion, Coaching, And Team Performance," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(1), pages 188-205, January.
    12. Nils Braakmann, 2008. "Intra-firm wage inequality and firm performance – First evidence from German linked employer-employee-data," Working Paper Series in Economics 77, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    13. A I Petrescu & R Simmons & S Bradley, 2004. "The impacts of human resource management practices and pay inequality on workers' job satisfaction," Working Papers 542602, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    14. repec:lan:wpaper:3619 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Cheolbeom Park, 2023. "Optimal salary inequality for team performance: evidence from National Football League data," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(24), pages 2773-2787, May.
    16. Peiyi Yu & Bac Luu, 2016. "Bank performance and executive pay: tournament or teamwork," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 607-643, October.

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