"Australia's National Electricity Market (NEM) has been a beacon for governments around the world considering power industry reform. However, while the energy-only NEM has served Australia well since 1998, deep structural supply-side faults exist. Competitive energy-only markets do not have a stable equilibrium solution unless reliability constraints are violated, market power is exercised, or scarcity pricing operates unabated. But the political economy of electricity means none of this is likely. This research finds that by reducing the NEM price cap and introducing a 'capacity payments pool', a tractable and politically acceptable equilibrium can be established to facilitate timely plant entry." Copyright (c)2008 The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research.
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Article provided by The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research in its journal Australian Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 41 (2008) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 349-370 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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