Regulation in Environmental Markets: What Can We Learn from Experiments to Reduce Salinity?
AbstractMarket based mechanisms are growing in importance in environmental policy making. In theory market based mechanisms equate marginal abatement costs between polluting sources, thereby allocating emissions control responsibility at least cost. The step from theory to field implementation is, however, difficult, as many aspects of policy must be made operational at the same time. Policy mistakes can be very costly to society and are extremely difficult to correct ex-post. Experimental Economics is an innovative method beginning to be used to design, test and illustrate public policy prior to field implementation. In this paper we discuss two types of market incentives, taxes and tradable emissions permits. We then illustrate an experiment being implemented to test these market mechanisms for the management of salinity in the Murray Darling Basin.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research in its journal The Australian Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Duke, Charlotte & Gangadharan, Lata, 2005. "Regulation in Environmental Markets: What can we learn from Experiments to Reduce Salinity?," 2005 Conference (49th), February 9-11, 2005, Coff's Harbour, Australia 137857, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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