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Food Processing Business and Agriculture Cooperatives in Japan: Market Power and Asymmetric Information

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  • Kazuhiko Mikami
  • Satoru Tanaka

Abstract

Food processing businesses run by agriculture cooperatives (in this paper referred to as food processing cooperatives) are basically firms that are owned by the suppliers of raw materials. Typically, in this type of firm, corporate decision‐making is the responsibility of member farmers through the one member one–vote rule, and the surplus of the business is divided among them according to the amount of raw agricultural products they have supplied to the firm. This is in contrast to a conventional capitalistic firm, in which corporate decision‐making is ultimately made by the stockholders through the one share–one vote rule, and the profit is divided among them according to the amount of financial capital they have supplied to the firm. Based upon statistical data and case studies, the present paper considers some economic factors that might influence the establishment of food processing cooperatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazuhiko Mikami & Satoru Tanaka, 2008. "Food Processing Business and Agriculture Cooperatives in Japan: Market Power and Asymmetric Information," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 83-107, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:asiaec:v:22:y:2008:i:1:p:83-107
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8381.2008.00270.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Kazuhiko Mikami & Satoru Tanaka, 2010. "Sunk Costs Of Capital And The Form Of Enterprise: Investor‐Owned Firms And Worker‐Owned Firms," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(1), pages 77-104, March.
    2. Niladri Sekhar Bagchi & Pulak Mishra & Bhagirath Behera & V. Ratna Reddy, 2022. "Collectivization of smallholder farmers, strategic competition, and market performance: Experiences from two selected villages of West Bengal, India," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(3), pages 710-733, July.
    3. Panagiotou, Dimitrios, 2019. "Pricing behavior in a mixed spatial duopsony with an agricultural cooperative under asymmetric information," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 0(Issue 1).

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