Meat retailers express demand for a more uniform product, and technical innovations are allowing an increasingly uniform supply. Packers can promote uniformity through pre-slaughter sorting, or earlier through contracts. Emphasizing effort on the packing line, we develop a model whereby packers gain from carcass handling efficiencies when animal uniformity increases. Whether optimally regulated or not, equilibrium food safety declines with increased uniformity. A line speed regulation can increase welfare in the presence of food safety externalities by reducing the opportunity cost of allocating effort toward promoting food safety. The regulation also reduces packer demand for more uniform animals. Copyright 2005 American Agricultural Economics Association.
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Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996.
"The LeChatelier Principle,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 173-79, March.
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