Hazardous tango: sovereign-bank interdependence and financial stability in the euro area
AbstractThe strong interdependence between banking and sovereign crisis has emerged as a salient feature of euro area crisis. This interdependence, for sure, is not a specific feature of the euro area. But as pointed out by several authors the vicious cycle seems to be extremely strong in the euro area. The reason why euro area banks and sovereigns seem to be indissolubly tied together is twofold. On one hand, in the absence of a supranational banking resolution framework, member states keep individual responsibility for the rescue of their national banking system. Given the size of the banking systems across the euro area, this implies that the fiscal consequences of rescuing banks are potentially very large and explains how stress in the banking system can spill over to sovereigns. On the other hand, domestic banks hold on their balance sheets a considerable share of the debt issued by their domestic government. Any doubt about sovereign solvency immediately therefore affects domestic banks. This two-way bank-sovereign interdependence constitutes one of the specific features of the euro area that renders it especially fragile. In spite of this demonstrated weakness there has been surprisingly little policy action to remedy this state of affairs. Proposals for giving the European Union or the euro area responsibility for rescuing banks, or at least backstopping national authorities, have been consistently rejected.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Banque de France in its journal Financial Stability Review.
Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): 16 (April)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, 2012. "Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Papers 12/284, International Monetary Fund.
- Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013.
"Should Non-Euro Area Countries Join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?,"
IEHAS Discussion Papers
1323, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013. "Should Non-Euro Area Countries Join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 141-163, June.
- Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013. "Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?," Working Papers 1305, Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analysis, Corvinus University of Budapest.
- Zsolt Darvas & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013. "Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?," Policy Contributions 773, Bruegel.
- Udaibir S. Das & Maria A. Oliva & Takahiro Tsuda, 2012. "Sovereign Risk: A Macro-Financial Perspective," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 8(3), pages 367-392, August.
- Alter, Adrian & Beyer, Andreas, 2012. "The dynamics of spillover effects during the European sovereign debt turmoil," CFS Working Paper Series 2012/13, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Das, Udaibir S. & Oliva, Maria A. & Tsuda, Takahiro, 2012. "Sovereign Risk: A Macro-Financial Perspective," ADBI Working Papers 383, Asian Development Bank Institute.
- Alter, Adrian & Beyer, Andreas, 2013. "The dynamics of spillover effects during the European sovereign debt crisis," Working Paper Series 1558, European Central Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marie-Christine Petit-Djemad).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.