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On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies

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Author Info
Svetlana Andrianova (University of Leicester)

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Abstract

This paper presents a model of opportunistic behaviour in decentralized economic exchange and considers the impact of inadequate institutional framework of formal contract enforcement on economic performance. It is shown that (i) when the number of cheating traders is sufficiently large, inadequate institutions result in a loss of decentralized trading contracts, (ii) an adequate institutional framework, while being necessary for the attainment of a Pareto optimal outcome, may not be sufficient if traders perceive it as inadequate; and (iii) sufficiently good formal enforcement provisions help deter contractual breach in environments with corrupt and powerful enforcers.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1353-1353
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Handle: RePEc:bep:thetop:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1353-1353

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Keywords: formal contract enforcement perceptions transition economies

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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  6. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 637-58, October.
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  19. Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Renner, Elke, 2000. "The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 265-277, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Svetlana Andrianova & Panicos Demetriades & Anja Shortland, 2006. "Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions, and Financial Development," WEF Working Papers 0011, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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