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On the Number of Contestants and Equilibrium Individual Effort

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Author Info
Baochun Peng
Abstract

This paper shows that in a contest with the "Tullock" forms of contest success function, an increase in the number of contestants always reduces individual effort. However, when the outcome of the contest is governed by a noisy function of effort, then individual effort could either increase or decrease following an increase in the number of contestants, depending on whether the density function of the shock is upward or downward sloping.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1305-1305
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Handle: RePEc:bep:thetop:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1305-1305

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Related research
Keywords: contest success function effort

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  2. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
  4. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.

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