This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Satya Das (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)
Sajal Lahiri (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper develops a model of terrorist activity and behavior. A terrorist organization chooses the size and the number of attacks. The defending state chooses the level of security-deterrence measures. The equilibrium sequence is such that the Organization moves first, followed by the State. A defensive policy such as an innovation in security-deterrence technology tends to reduce the size of attacks but increase their number, while an offensive policy, lowering the total "strike" or "output" potential of a terrorist organization, has opposite effects. Both policies reduce the expected damage from terror. An individual's decision to become a terrorist or a financier is also modeled, leading to endogenous supplies of terrorists and funds. The effects of terrorist-flushing measures, provisions to curb the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and income-enhancing policies are evaluated by taking into account their "supply-side" effects.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1295&context=bejte
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1295-1295
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:thetop:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1295-1295

Note: oai:bepress:bejte-1295
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: terrorism counter-terrorism policies security-deterrence measures puppy dog strategy terrorist-flushing measures

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Atkinson, Scott E & Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John, 1987. "Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, April.
  2. Ono, Yoshiyasu, 1982. "Price Leadership: A Theoretical Analysis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 49(193), pages 11-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Darius Lakdawalla & George Zanjani, 2002. "Insurance, Self-Protection, and the Economics of Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 9215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Das, Satya P. & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2008. "Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism," MPRA Paper 8223, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 77% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.