This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Yossi Feinberg (Stanford University)
Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion - Israel Institute of Technology)
Abstract

We consider a single indivisible object auctioned in an ascending bid English auction. Two variations of this auction are compared with respect to the seller's revenue. In the first mechanism the participants observe the identity of a bidder that drops from the auction while in the second variation they only observe that someone has dropped, however this bidder remains anonymous. We show that the anonymous mechanism could yield a higher expected revenue to the seller and that, generically, neither auction format dominates the other with respect to revenue maximization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=bejte
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1061-1061
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:thetop:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1061-1061

Note: oai:bepress:bejte-1061
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Thierry, FOUCAULT & Stefano, LOVO, 2003. "Linkage principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions," Les Cahiers de Recherche 785, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  2. Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000. "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 106-120, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Haile, Philip A. & Riley, John G., 2002. "Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 19-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also computes impact factors for journals and working paper series.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.