This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
David Gill (Trinity College, University of Oxford)
Daniel Sgroi (Faculty of Economics and Churchill College, University of Cambridge)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=bejte
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Subscription to the journal may be required to access full texts.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Topics in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1178-1178
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bep:thetop:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1178-1178

Note: oai:bepress:bejte-1178
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.bepress.com/subscriptions.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: takeovers sequential pivotal

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Nalebuff, Barry, 1992. "To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
  2. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.