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Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal

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Author Info
Hayley Chouinard (Washington State University)
Jonathan Yoder (Washington State University)

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Abstract

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid repeated auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders' value distributions. When contract value is constant from one auction to the next and winners' values are publicized, agents retain the value of incumbency and bids are identical to one-shot auctions. When each agent's contract values are random across auctions, agents choose to bid away the full expected value of incumbency, providing a measure of the value of information in this context.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1332&context=bejte
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Contributions to Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1332-1332
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Handle: RePEc:bep:thecon:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1332-1332

Note: oai:bepress:bejte-1332
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Related research
Keywords: repeated auctions right of first refusal

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Hayley H. Chouinard, 2005. "Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 1083-1088, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June. [Downloadable!]
  3. Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 271-293, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics 9701004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hayley Chouinard, 2006. "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2006-6, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sushil Bikhchandani & Steven Lippman & Reade Ryan, 2005. "On the Right-of-First-Refusal," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1194-1194. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Osmundsen, Petter, 1996. "Repeated Auctions of Franchises for Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 183-89, September.
  9. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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