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Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders

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Author Info
Jeong-Yoo Kim (GRIPS)

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Abstract

This paper investigates the possibility of signal jamming in games with multiple informed parties whose interests are conflicting. The possibility that signal jamming occurs in equilibrium depends on the observability of individual signals. Paradoxically, if the receiver can observe individual signals perfectly, signal jamming can occur in equilibrium, while it cannot occur if the receiver can observe only the one-dimensional signal synthesized from the senders' individual actions.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Contributions to Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1080-1080
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Handle: RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1080-1080

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Related research
Keywords: signal jamming signaling games multiple senders

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1991. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 155-172, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2003. "Entry Deterrence And Entry Inducement In An Industry With Complementary Products," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 107-123, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mark N. Hertzendorf & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1998. "Will the high-quality producer please stand up?: A model of duopoly signaling," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  6. Robert Gibbons, 1989. "Learning In Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 2547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rupayan Pal, . "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence:A Reassessment of Limit Pricing," Working Papers id:1375, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
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