Market Research and Market Design

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Market Research and Market Design

Author Info

Sandeep Baliga (Northwestern University)
Rakesh Vohra (Northwestern University)

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Sandeep Baliga

Abstract

We study trading models when the distribution of signals such as costs or values is not known to traders or the mechanism designer when the profit-maximizing trading procedure is designed. We present adaptive mechanisms that simultaneously elicit this information (market research) while maintaining incentive compatibility and maximizing profits when the set of traders is large (market design). First, we study a monopoly pricing model where neither the seller nor the buyers know the distribution of values. Second, we study a model with a broker intermediating trade between a large number of buyers and sellers with private information about their valuations and costs. We show that when the set of traders becomes large our adaptive mechanisms achieve the same expected profits for the monopolist and the broker as when the distribution of signals is common knowledge.

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Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Advances in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1059-1059
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Handle: RePEc:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1059-1059

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Paper
- Sandeep Baliga & Rakesh Vohra, 2003. "Market Research and Market Design," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000336, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
McAfee, R. Preston, 1992. "A dominant strategy double auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 434-450, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- McAfee, R. Preston., 1990. "A Dominant Strategy Double Auction," Working Papers 734, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Ilya Segal, 2003. "Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 509-529, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bernard Caillaud & Jacques Robert, 2003. "Implementing the Optimal Auction," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-31, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," CARESS Working Papres 99-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2007. "When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries?," Diskussionsschriften dp0706, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2007. "When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries?," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1014, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]

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