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The Principal-Agent Matching Market

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Author Info
Kaniska Dam (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium and Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, Mexico)
David Perez-Castrillo (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain)

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Abstract

We propose an agency model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous principals and heterogeneous agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes (equilibria) of this market. In this regard we generalise the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). Unlike in the standard principal-agent theory, equilibrium payoffs of all the individuals are endogenous, equilibrium contracts are Pareto optimal, and the incremental surplus generated in a principal-agent relationship accrues to the tenant. We design a simple non-cooperative game which implements the set of stable outcomes in subgame perfect equilibrium. We also suggest policy measures in relation to efficiency and income distribution.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Advances in Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1257-1257
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Handle: RePEc:bep:theadv:v:2:y:2006:i:1:p:1257-1257

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Related research
Keywords: principal-agent moral hazard matching implementation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Pandey, Priyanka, 2000. "Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 303-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Redistribution and Non-consumption Smoothing in an Open Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(3), pages 411-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
  5. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-89, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 92, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
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  7. de Mesa, David & Webb, David C., 1992. "Efficient credit rationing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1277-1290, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 203-220, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Perez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 461-474, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Fátima Barros & Inés Macho-Stadler, 1998. "Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 89-103, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Sengupta, Kunal, 1997. "Limited liability, moral hazard and share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 393-407, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September. [Downloadable!]
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  15. V. Bhaskar, 2002. "Relative Performance Evaluation and Limited Liability," Economics Discussion Papers 550, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Kamecke, U, 1989. "Non-cooperative Matching Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 423-31.
  18. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2002. "Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World," CEPR Discussion Papers 3469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. repec:fth:coluec:756 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2003. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Economics Working Papers 0030, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Shetty, Sudhir, 1988. "Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jérome Pouyet & Bernard Salanié & Francois Salanié, 2008. "On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1385-1385. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Michael Kosfeld & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2007. "Competition, Cooperation, and Corporate Culture," IZA Discussion Papers 2927, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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