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Optimal Law Enforcement when the Offender can Dispose of his Wealth

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Author Info
Jeong-Yoo Kim (Kyung Hee University)

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Abstract

In this paper we assert that, if an offender can dispose of some or all of his wealth after violating the law, raising the fine up to his wealth level will induce him to dispose of his wealth, thereby increasing social cost without deterring more offenses. This suggests that the socially optimal fine should be set below the offender's maximum wealth level.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Review of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 3
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Handle: RePEc:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:3

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Related research
Keywords: law enforcement crime deterrence wealth

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1991. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 3232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Levitt, Steven D., 1997. "Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 179-192, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-28.

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