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Path Dependence or Convergence? The Evolution of Corporate Ownership Around the World

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Author Info
Andrew Jia-Yuh Yeh (Reserve Bank of New Zealand)
Steven Lim (Economics Department, University of Waikato)
Ed Vos (Finance Department, University of Waikato)
Abstract

We offer a model that sheds light on the debate over whether corporate ownership concentration converges to the Berle-Means image. Our model takes into account the importance of both legal rules and firm-specific arrangements. Our analytical result is that share ownership concentration either persists or falls depending on the relative importance of these protective arrangements. In particular, our model predicts: (a) diffuse corporate ownership in nations that impose legal limits on blockholders' clout to expropriate minority shareholder rights, and (b) concentrated corporate ownership in nations that rely on asset specificity as a form of investor protection. Our empirical work suggests partial convergence toward Berle-Means diffuse share ownership. It is thereby reasonable to infer the existence of path dependent forces on ownership concentration. But this result does not preclude the possibility of functional convergence or convergence to the diffuse form of share ownership via cross-listings on the major U.S. stock exchanges that impose stringent disclosure and listing requirements. In essence, these results suggest a case for the co-existence of the preexisting path-dependency and functional-convergence stories.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal Review of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 12
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Handle: RePEc:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:12

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Related research
Keywords: corporate governance ownership concentration institutions quality of governance path dependence and functional convergence

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  2. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  3. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998. "Law, Finance, and Firm Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 2107-2137, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X, 1996. "The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 1019-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ayyagari, Meghana, 2004. "Does cross-listing lead to functional convergence? Empirical evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3264, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, 2002. "Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?," NBER Working Papers 9380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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