The popularity of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the subject of much controversy. This paper examines usage of the ICJ by all United Nations (UN) member states as compared with its usage by those states with the top-ten economies of the world. Five hypotheses explaining the decrease in ICJ usage by the top-ten economies are presented as follows: (1) a home-bias of judges, (2) the diversification of international tribunals, (3) changes in the composition of the cases filed, (4) the (re-)allocation of power, and (5) an increased heterogeneity of external institutions among UN member states. We find empirical evidence that an increase in UN membership has led to increased heterogeneity, which in turn has led to a decline in usage of the ICJ by the top-ten economies.
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